In the decades since the fall of authoritarian ruler Suharto, Indonesia has been a model for the spread of democracy. The country is now among the world’s most populous and most vibrant democracies, with well-functioning political institutions, a free press, and a wide array of nongovernmental organisations focused on human rights and development. But the 2024 elections revealed that the country is not as consolidated as it once seemed, with a number of worrying trends, including arbitrary state crackdowns on freedom of expression and organisation, the rise of vigilantism, deepening political polarisation and populist mobilisation, and the erosion of checks and balances on executive power. This volume brings together leading scholars to identify, explain and debate these developments.
The 1945 constitution invests most executive power in the president, who serves as both head of state and head of government. The president is assisted by a vice president and a cabinet, and the constitution provides for a body of presidential advisers and a Supreme Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan) to oversee the government’s finances. The president and vice president can serve up to two five-year terms.
Since its inception, the New Order regime has sought to distinguish itself from the stormy nationalism and revolutionary rhetoric that characterized the early years of independence, when Indonesia faced communal and economic breakdown. It also aimed to maintain the official state philosophy, Pancasila. This official ideology encompasses the idea that the state is above all others and the state is inherently just, but it is open to all beliefs and religions.
During Suharto’s rule, Indonesia also underwent significant economic growth and modernisation, with the establishment of a market economy and the emergence of large multinational corporations. However, economic inequality is still a pressing issue and poverty remains widespread.
After the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia’s reformers sought to establish a multiparty system and a constitution that would guarantee fundamental freedoms and the democratic principles of rule of law and limited executive powers. The process of democratisation has been slower than expected, and a significant gap between rich and poor persists. Corruption remains a major problem, and the military’s influence on politics and governance continues to be strong.
In addition to these challenges, the 2024 election campaign revealed that the country’s judicial institutions are vulnerable to political interference and lack independence. The chief justice of the Constitutional Court, for example, reversed a longstanding ruling that bars sitting presidents from electoral politics, enabling Jokowi’s 36-year-old son Gibran to run as his vice presidential running mate. The president has also used the COVID-19 pandemic to tighten restrictions on media freedoms and criminalise critics of his performance. Despite these challenges, the authors of this volume believe that Indonesia’s democracy is more resilient than it may appear at first glance. However, the extent to which it survives depends on whether ruling elites understand that society and its critics—including the media and journalists—are not their enemy. This is a vital prerequisite for democratic consolidation.