Since the end of authoritarian Suharto rule in 1998, Indonesia has been in a period of reform known as the “era of Reformation.” Although the country has made significant progress in moving toward democratic governance—including free and fair elections, decentralized government and limits on presidential power—it remains a work in progress.
The PDI-P (the party of former president Megawati Sukarnoputri) leads the legislative branch and holds the presidency, but it is not without challenges. Its electoral support is not very high, and it faces competition from parties rooted in the nationalist, pro-government tradition of the New Order. Its ideological diversity has facilitated multiparty coalition governments and prevented the formation of an all-powerful single-party government, which would threaten the democratic system.
However, Indonesia has not managed to overcome its problem with clientelism and nepotism within political parties. The dominant system of patron-client relations, which arose in the context of the New Order’s legacy of local elite dominance and centralization of power, persists even after decades of democratic transition. In addition to limiting the ability of political parties to identify competent candidates, it also exacerbates the tendency for politicians to reward their loyal supporters with positions in local and regional governments. In turn, this creates a vicious circle wherein political parties reward clients and compete with one another for the same voters.
This is partly because of a lack of funding for the parties, which makes it difficult to vet competent candidates or discipline their unqualified members. Furthermore, the party system does not offer a clear ideology that can attract committed followers. The result is that in the last two presidential elections, Indonesia has experienced serious polarization between a moderate candidate who stands within the nationalist Sukarno tradition and an Islamist who has the full support of Islamic parties/groups.
Despite the problems with clientelism and polarization, Indonesia’s democracy has a number of positive features, including the separation of powers between parliament and the executive, as well as a high level of participation in politics. In particular, the switch to direct regional elections in 2005 enabled a new generation of impressive leaders—who typically start out their careers as local executives—to emerge. Although they still need to ally with political parties, their direct mandate from citizens requires them to be responsive to voters and not just to their party bosses’ rent-seeking practices and patronage networks.
The state promotes equality in access to education, public office and employment, but specific hurdles remain for women, poor rural citizens, the LGBTQ community and ethnic and religious minorities. Freedom of expression is generally well-protected, but laws against blasphemy and defamation can inhibit the expression of controversial views.
Although the legal framework for elections is generally fair, election management bodies are not impartial and are subject to pressure from political parties. In addition, the hereditary sultan of Yogyakarta retains his monopoly on provincial governorships, and some politicians have used this privilege to promote their own interests. In addition, Indonesians are concerned about the impact of social media on public debate and on their daily lives.